Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 50
Issue 1 May-June

Article 8

Summer 1959

Abstracts of Recent Cases

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Abstracts of Recent Cases, 50 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 46 (1959-1960)

This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS

defense of indigent persons in justice and police
courts. It has been the experience of those associated with the program-the bar, the prosecutors,
judges and teachers-that student counsel are
usually well prepared, enthusiastic in their defense,
and surprisingly successful in their record of cases
won. 16 This practice is carried on under Colorado
statutory and rule authorization.17
A recent survey by a committee of the Association of American Law Schools shows that law
16Letter from Acting Dean Harold E. Hurst, University of Denver College of Law, to the Journal.
17 COL. REv. STAT. §12-1-19 (1953). The statute provides: "Students of any law school which has been continuously in existence for at least ten years prior to the
passage of this section and which maintains a legal aid
dispensary where poor persons receive legal advice and
services shall when representing said dispensary and its
clients and then only be authorized to appear in court
as if licensed to practice." COL. R. Civ. P. 226A provides: "Students in the junior or senior class of any law
school recognized by this court may, without fee, represent indigent persons in any justice of the peace or
municipal court in Colorado; provided such representation be with the approval of the Dean of the said law
school and the justice or judge of said court."
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students are allowed to appear unofficially, or by
local court rule, in several other jurisdictions."5
The results of the programs at Harvard and the
University of Denver demonstrate that law student
representation of indigent defendants in misdemeanor cases can be effective for both the accused
and the student. The benefit to the student is
obvious. He is gathering not only law research
ability but also a wealth of trial experience.
The most formidable obstacles to be overcome
before a system of student defenders could go into
effect generally are the unauthorized practice
statutes of most of the states. Legislative action,
or the exercise of the rule-making power of the
several supreme courts, is necessary here. All law
schools, students interested in the administration
of the criminal law, the organized bar, and the
judiciary should explore together this great need
for far more effective representation of the indigent. Student defender programs can go a long
way towards solving this problem.
Jim THowsoN
Is

AALS,

REPORT OF THE COmIITTEE ON LEGAL

Am CLINICS (1958).

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Francis A. Heroux
The Refusal to Answer Questions because of
Possible Incrimination in Another JurisdictionIn a Pennsylvania civil suit, a witness invoked his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
because the questions asked related to a pending
criminal prosecution of him in New York. Upon
attack, the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas
for the City of Philadelphia upheld the use of the
privilege against self-incrimination, even though
the testimony would not have subjected the witness to criminal liability within Pennsylvania.
Putnik Travel and Tourist Agency v. Goldberg, 27
U.S. L. WEEK 2319 (Pa. Jan. 6, 1959).
Although the court could not find any Pennsylvania cases relating to this question, it did determine that the great weight of authority only
extends the privilege of self-incrimination to matters incriminating under the laws of the state
where the privilege is invoked. However, the court
found some authority for the view that the privilege is available if the prosecution in the other
state is actually impending rather than remote.
Ballman v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906). This was
the view adopted by the court. (See Comment,

Self-Incrimination And The Two Sovereignties Rule,
49 J. Cium. L., C. & P. S. 240 (1958)).
Two Courts Extend Constitutional Rights to
Juvenile Court Hearings-The petitioner, a boy
twelve years of age, applied for a writ of habeas
corpus, because he had been adjudged a juvenile
delinquent for the murder of two persons and had
later been certified for trial as an adult in the
criminal court. He alleged that the proceedings in
the juvenile court were unconstitutional inasmuch
as unsworn testimony was admitted in evidence
against him and no record was made of the proceedings which might form the basis for appeal.
The Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma
granted the writ, quashed the pending criminal
proceedings, and remanded the case to the juvenile
court for a new hearing. In Re Smith, 326 P. 835
(Okla. 1958). The court held that a juvenile
offender is entitled to the constitutional safeguards
which surround the trials of adult offenders. Even
though the statute made no provision for a transcript of proceedings in the juvenile court, the
court said that due process required it. And the
same ruling was applied to the requirement of
sworn testimony against the defendant. The court

1959]

CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS AND ABSTRACTS

noted that proceedings involving the property
rights of juveniles were conducted with great care
and that the same standard should be applied in
cases involving the juvenile's life and liberty.
In the second case, the defendant had been
adjudged a juvenile delinquent in the juvenile
court of the District of Columbia. He was later
indicted and brought to trial in the District Court
as an adult. He pleaded that this second trial
placed him in double jeopardy in violation of his
constitutional rights and this defense was sustained
by the District Court which dismissed the indictment. United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp.
899 (D.C. 1958).
This District of Columbia case is apparently the
first one which squarely holds that a juvenile
offender is entitled to all the constitutional rights
of an adult offender. While the opinion deals
specifically with the provision against double
jeopardy, the dictum in the case extends to other
fundamental rights, e.g., privilege against selfincrimination, right to counsel.
Most of the previous authority in this field has
held the other way. Rights such as the privileges
against double jeopardy and self-incrimination
were held not to apply to juvenile court hearings
on the grounds that these were not criminal cases,
that they were civil hearings conducted under the
parens patriacpowers of the state. The court in the
instant case held, however, that what matters is
not the name applied to the hearing, but whether
the result of the hearing might be a deprivation of
liberty. If it was, all the constitutional safeguards
applied.
"Precious constitutional rights cannot be diminished or whittled away by the device of changing names of tribunals or modifying the nomenclature of legal proceedings," said the court. And
if the juvenile delinquency acts denied juveniles
these rights, the court concluded they would be
unconstitutional.
The Insanity Defense and the Durham RuleIn two very similar cases, the states of Massachusetts and Connecticut had occasion to review their
rules on the insanity defense, when two murder
defendants argued that the Durham rule (Durham
v. United States, 214 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)
should be adopted. The Durham rule, in substance, holds that an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease.
The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors re-

jected the proposed Durham rule in no uncertain
terms. State v. Davies, 27 U.S.L. WEFK 2385,
(Jan. 20, 1959). It realized that there was a great
need for improvement in the area of the insanity
defense. However, it believed that what was
needed was clarification, and the Durham rule does
nothing at all towards supplying this. The chief
criticism directed against the Durham rule was
that it leaves the words "disease", "defect" and
"product" undefined, thus making its legal test
vague and ambiguous. Under such an indefinite
standard, a juror would have nothing more to base
his decision on, other than his personal sense of
justice. This could mean that an accused, subject
only to the Durham rule, could know the nature
and quality of his act, know that it was wrong,
have the will power to restrain his act, and yet,
by reason of his mental disease, develop egocentric
or sadistic tendencies which could produce homicide with criminal impunity. Connecticut saw no
good reason to adopt such a test of criminal
liability.
The Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts
reached a similar result in regard to the qualities
of the Durham rule. Commonwealth v. Chester, 150
N.E. 2d 914 (1958). However, the Massachusetts
court went much further in its discussion of the
insanity defense and, in effect, levelled a severe
criticism at the whole area of the law and at its
own rule, which is based on whether the defendant
"acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable
impulse." The court's working premise was that
the present state of the law leaves much to be
desired. Specifically, it said that the Massachusetts irresistible impulse test is not satisfactory,
and the court does not labor under the illusion
that it is. But, whatever may be said against the
Massachusetts and Connecticut tests of criminal
responsibility, they at least have a standard to
guide the triers of fact, while the Durham rule
leaves the triers with virtually none.
Court Prescribes Proper Jury Instruction Regarding Insanity Defenses-The defendant was
indicted for robbery, and, at his trial, he entered a
plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity." The
jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the defendant appealed, charging that the trial court
had given the jury erroneous instructions concerning the defense of "not guilty by reason of insanity." The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia affirmed the jury verdict,
holding that the instructions to the jury were not
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improper, but that similar instructions should not
be used in subsequent cases. The court then outlined what it considered to be the proper jury
instruction on the defense of not guilty by reason
of insanity. Lyles v. United States, 254 F. 2d 725
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
In dealing with this problem of what, if anything, the court should instruct the jury concerning the consequences of a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity, the court said, "We think the
jury has a right to know the meaning of this
possible verdict, as accurately as it knows, by
common knowledge, the meaning of the other two
possible verdicts-guilty or not guilty." Thus, the
court suggested that when the instruction is given,
the jury should simply be informed that "a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity means that the
accused will be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill until the superintendent has certified, and
the court is satisfied, that such person has recovered his sanity and will not, in his reasonable
future, be dangerous to himself or to others, in
which event, and, at which time, the court shall
order his release, either unconditionally, or under
such conditions as the court may see fit."
Intent to Defraud Necessary for Moral Turpitude-An attorney notified the Treasury Department that he would not pay his income tax because he had been classified as a security risk and
thus made a "second-class citizen." The tax authorities reciprocated with a criminal charge of
tax-evasion, and the attorney was sentenced to six
months in jail after he entered a plea of nolo
contendere. Following this, The Washington State
Bar Association began summary disciplinary
proceedings against the attorney, and a complaint
was filed with the Supreme Court of Washington.
The court held that disbarment would be too
drastic a sanction to impose in this case, but that
the attorney should be censured and reprimanded
for his action. In. Re Molthan, 327 P.2d 427
(Wash. 1958).
The court based its decision on the finding that
there was no moral turpitude involved in this case.
It followed the rationale that it is not the act
itself, but the corrupt and criminal motive with
which the act is done, that determines the offense.
The facts did not indicate that the attorney in-
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tended to defraud or deceive the government. On
the contrary, he notified the tax authorities of his
intention not to file a tax return, and he kept adequate records of his finances. Therefore, fraud and
deceit were not inherent in his conduct, which was
at most only lacking in good judgment. (See Comment, Tax Evasion And Moral Turpitude, 49 3.
Czmn. L., C. & P. S.145 (1958)).
Violation of Illegal Condition Does Not Void
Probation-The defendant in a criminal case was
given probation, one of the conditions imposed
being that he post a $1500 appearance bond to
guarantee his regular attendance when summoned
in the future by the court or the probation officer.
The defendant and his sureties appealed and the
Supreme Court of Colorado reversed, holding that
the action of the trial court was beyond its power.
Logan v. People, 332 P.2d 897 (Colo. 1958). The
court, in its review of the probation statute, found
nothing authorizing the trial court to require a
probationer to post an appearance bond. On the
contrary, the statute provided that a bond could
be required after a defendant violated his probation. The court also noted that such a condition
would work a hardship on a defendant who was in
all other respects worthy of probation, but who
was not able to afford the cost of a bond.
The court reviewed the general considerations
relevant to the granting of probation and concluded that "Either the applicant is a worthy risk
for probation, or he is not. If he is worthy, his
release on probation should not be weighted with
terms and conditions having nothing to do with
the purpose and policy of probation laws. If he is
not a worthy risk, probation should be denied."
The court's opinion seems to furnish this guide
for attorneys in cases where the judge insists upon
a condition not clearly authorized by the applicable
probation law: that they should accept the probation with the illegal condition attached-rather
than risk the ire of the judge who might otherwise
deny the probation as a matter of discretion if the
condition were disputed-and then later advise
their clients that the illegal condition might be
disregarded without risking the loss of probation.
(For other recent case abstracts see "Police Science
Legal Abstracts and Notes", infra pp. 97-99 and
"Abstracts Of Recent Cases", infra pp. 68-70).

